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Abstract
Customary irrigation techniques employed by New Mexico irrigators may place
them in jeopardy of a Section 9 ‘take’ under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) if their
diversion constitutes a foreseeable harm that may kill or impair reproduction of a listed
fish species. Unless irrigators are covered by a federal incidental take statement, anyone
can challenge the activity if harm was done or may occur in the future. What constitutes a
‘take’ is a highly contentious issue; a dead fish is not necessary to prove an action will
violate Section 9 since future ‘harm’ that is ‘imminent’ can also be seen as a ‘take.’ How
may irrigators reduce their liability in a situation where the diversion clearly poses harm?
The option with immediate benefits for fish is for an irrigator to leave more water instream by increasing irrigation efficiency. This must be backed up by applying for a
Section 10 Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) or Safe Harbor Agreement to gain legal
protection from a lawsuit.
New Mexico has not developed in-stream flow incentives for irrigators because
historically, state law has not explicitly recognized the value of water left in-stream for
fish. This complicates the situation for New Mexico irrigators not tied to federal
programs, which includes many small community irrigation districts and acequia
communities. New Mexico irrigators should be pro-active in protecting their water right.
Emerging state-based incentive programs that seek to leave water in-stream are a start in
the right direction, but applied alone without a Section 10 HCP, will not fully reduce their
ESA liability.

I.

Introduction
The United States (US) government has played a large role in fresh water habitat

modification with the financing and building of many flood control and water storage
dams across the United States. These projects were built to encourage settlement and
agricultural production. It is widely known that these federal actions have played a
significant role in modifying fresh water habitat, leading to the decline of many fish
species nationwide. This also holds true for habitat modification by non-federal parties,
which may be smaller in scale, but nonetheless have had an adverse impact on fish. In an
attempt to halt species loss, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of
1973.1 Within the Endangered Species Act there is a distinction between federal actions
and non-federal actions that can cause jeopardy to a listed species. Generally, Section 7
of the ESA guides federal actions while Section 9 guides actions by private parties.
Currently, conflict is brewing in New Mexico between farmers and fish.
Traditional agricultural practices in New Mexico have altered riverine habitat by actions
that include the dewatering of streams, draining of wetland riparian areas, and
construction of dams and levees. Many fish and bird species endemic to New Mexico
rely on this riverine and riparian habitat, and its continued modification has placed many
species at risk, including the Rio Grande silvery minnow and the Southwestern willow
flycatcher. Past actions in river systems, including irrigation diversions and other riverine
habitat modifications have resulted in the listing of these two species as endangered, and
continued habitat modification will result in listings of other water dependant species.
Because of the way the ESA is written, current irrigation practices in New Mexico that

1

utilize direct diversion from a stream have the potential to violate Section 9 of the ESA
by committing a ‘take’ of endangered fish.
Since irrigators are the primary users of surface water, any attempt to leave water
in-stream is met with resistance, and legislative attempts to establish in-stream flows
have repeatedly failed since the 1970’s. However, two 1998 attorney general opinions
suggest that State law does not explicitly prohibit in-stream flows, and an in-stream flow
could be granted as a change to an existing water right.2 In addition, New Mexico must
meet water delivery compact obligations to Texas, which means that New Mexico
irrigators cannot divert the entire flow of interstate streams such as the Pecos River or the
Rio Grande. This essentially creates an in-stream flow at times when water is released to
meet compact obligations. These flows are not continuous, but can have ancillary benefits
if the water is released at critical times that would benefit fish species. Despite the
potential for in-stream flows and the fact compact deliveries keep water in-stream,
diverting water for irrigation has the greatest impact on fish in New Mexico and should
be the focus of efforts to leave more water in-stream.
This discussion will primarily revolve around irrigators not tied to federal actions,
though the federal nexus does play a role. Section 7 of the ESA allows for an incidental
take statement (ITS) as part of the biological opinion for a specific federal action. An ITS
allows the federal action to proceed as long as it does not jeopardize the listed species. As
1

16 U.S.C. § 1531. Endangered Species Act of 1973. P.L. 93-205, December 28, 1973.
The question was posed, “Does New Mexico law (constitutional, statutory, or case law) permit the State Engineer to afford legal
protection to instream flows for recreational, fish or wildlife, or ecological purposes?” Two separate, but similar opinions were
written. D.L. Sanders & Stephen R. Farris, January 8, 1998. Memorandum – Instream Flow, Request from AG for the State Engineer’s
Opinion. (On file with author). This memorandum states that “constructed works” are necessary to comply with the diversion
requirement, and that a “metering device” would suffice (at 6). They also stated “…no legislation is necessary because the state
engineer is not barred by the Constitution, statute or case law from entertaining an application for a permit for instream use; and if
granted, it would be afforded the same protections as any other permitted, licensed or adjudicated water right.” (at 8). See also, Alletta
Belin, Opinion No. 98-01, March 27, 1998. In this opinion, it was determined that it is legal for the State Engineer to allow an instream flow right, if it is brought as a change from an existing use to an in-stream use, and conditioned upon having a metering device.
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was done recently with regards to consultation for the silvery minnow, federal water
users in the middle Rio Grande were placed under this incidental take ‘blanket.’ The
biological opinion also covered non-federal actions. In a review of documentation for
New Mexico endangered fish (excluding the Rio Grande silvery minnow), only one
biological opinion was found, and the ITS ‘blanket’ was not extended to non-federal
actions.3 The absence of other biological opinions for endangered fish in New Mexico
shows that there have been no recent federal actions that may adversely affect fish.
However, there are plenty of private irrigators that modify fish habitat through individual
diversions and acequias/community ditches. Unless these private irrigators apply for a
Section 10 Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) or Safe Harbor Agreement to ensure their
actions do not jeopardize listed fish species, they may be at risk for a Section 9 ‘take.’

II.

Objectives
This paper will focus on 1) how Section 9 of the ESA creates legal liability for

non-federal irrigators in New Mexico, and 2) how this group of irrigators can use existing
federal and state incentive programs to reduce their liability. The word ‘irrigators’
includes

individual

irrigators,

irrigation

districts,

conservancy

districts,

acequias/community ditches and Pueblos. Although these users are lumped together, their
different organizational statuses with both the State and federal government may result in
distinctive degrees of ESA liability. For example, New Mexico laws governing an

3
Review of US Fish and Wildlife Documents for the five endangered fish in New Mexico shows that many of these species do not
have associated biological opinions. New Mexico’s endangered fish include the Gila topminnow, Gila trout, Pecos gambusia,
razorback sucker and the Rio Grande silvery minnow. Many have recovery plans and have directly attributed irrigation impacts to
watercourses as a cause in species decline. The Gila Topminnow has an associated biological opinion, however it primarily pertains to
grazing on federal lands. The following webpages have information about all endangered species in New Mexico and relevant
biological opinions and recovery plans. Available at:
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irrigation district may act as a barrier for conservation and individuals within the
irrigation district may not want to participate, especially if it means an increase in cost.
Plus, who would bear the potential ESA liability? The district, each individual, or maybe
the individual who uses the most? Another scenario would entail many individual
irrigators or a combination of irrigation districts and individual irrigators whose
combined diversion caused a ‘take.’ A lawsuit would have to enjoin them all if it is not
clear which diversion was at fault. Differences may be significant in terms of who is
liable, or to what degree they may be liable depending on priority, amount diverted and
timing of diversion. Also, Pueblos and acequias hold the most senior water rights when
compared to many irrigation districts, and this could be important when determining or
apportioning ESA liability.
Since there are no in-stream flow protections in New Mexico, if all irrigators
exercise their water rights on a stream, essentially drying it up and killing fish, they are
not violating state law but could be held liable under federal law for a Section 9 ‘take.’
How may irrigators reduce their liability under the ESA? Increasing irrigation efficiency
is one way. An irrigator or irrigation district can prepare a Habitat Conservation Plan
(HCP) to demonstrate that an increase in efficiency will reduce the amount of water that
needs to be diverted, thereby leaving more water in-stream. If an applicant can prove that
leaving more water in the stream enhances habitat, and that this reduced diversion does
not cause harm to the fish population, the applicant may qualify under Section 10 for an
incidental take permit. This provides legal protection with the understanding their
irrigation activities will incidentally ‘take’ a few listed fish species as part of normal
http://ifw2es.fws.gov/Library/ListDocs.cfm?Topic=Endangered+Species&Section=EndangeredSpecies [Accessed 5 November 2004],
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operations. However, this may only work if the Office of the State Engineer (OSE)
allows the conserved water to remain in-stream. Typically when there is water available,
it goes to the next junior appropriator. Since many streams and rivers in New Mexico are
over-appropriated, there is a chance that the conserved water will instead satisfy the next
appropriator and not the fish.
Some states in the West have recognized that apportioning water via the prior
appropriation system has resulted in dwindling stream flows. These states created
incentive programs for conservation with the realization that conserved water has value
in-stream.4 These programs compete with growing municipalities that are willing to pay
top dollar to lease or purchase water rights. Some of these stream-based programs take
the form of a state-owned in-stream flow right, short-term leases, or purchasing then
retiring the right.5
If New Mexico lawmakers are made aware that state water laws are not sufficient
to help irrigators deal with federal ESA liability, statutory incentives may be made
available to irrigators who conserve with the understanding that many are potentially
liable for a ‘take’ under Section 9 of the ESA.

III.

Endangered Species Act
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA)6 in 1973 to prevent

extinction by protecting species along with associated habitat. The ESA applies to both
the federal government and private citizens by regulating land and water use decisions
that can directly or indirectly cause harm to a species, as well as protections that make it
and http://arizonaes.fws.gov/biologic.htm [Accessed 5 November 2004].
4
See discussion in Section V. about programs in Idaho, Oregon and Washington.
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illegal to ‘take,’ a listed species.7 The ESA allows any citizen the opportunity to petition
for a listing, comment on that listing and sue if they believe provisions are not being
followed or enforced. The ESA encourages federal and state governments to work
collaboratively and come up with plans to protect threatened and endangered species,
particularly with respect to water resource issues. However, court cases do arise despite
Congress’ intent for collaboration. These cases have attempted to define some of the
vague wording in the ESA, especially the meaning of ‘harm’ resulting in a ‘take.’
The most important sections of the ESA to the discussion surrounding irrigation
diversions are as follows: The word ‘take’ encompasses many actions that do not have to
result in killing a species.8 This definition is important in determining if ‘harm’ via
stream dewatering by irrigation will ‘take’ fish. ‘Harm’ to a listed species can place the
federal government or a ‘person’ in violation of a Section 9 ‘take,’9 and the violator may
be assessed a civil penalty under federal law.10 The ESA allows an individual citizen to
sue in order to protect listed species.11 Since an irrigation diversion can de-water a
stream, the threat of future ‘harm’ can rise to the level of a ‘take’ and an injunction can
be used to stop the action.12 These citizen suits, including a landmark challenge over
enforcement of the ESA in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill, have empowered
people to become involved in species preservation, rather than leaving it up to the federal
government. Section 10 allows for an incidental taking of a listed species if the applicant

5

Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1531. Endangered Species Act of 1973. P.L. 93-205, December 28, 1973.
7
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). The word ‘take’ is defined in section 2 as “…to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”
8
Id.
9
16 U.S.C. § 1538.
10
16 U.S.C. § 1540.
11
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
12
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A).
6
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can mitigate the impacts of an otherwise lawful activity that may kill a few individual
members of a species.13 This can encourage habitat modifiers such as irrigators to change
their actions and allow them to participate in species recovery and protection by offering
immunity from a ‘take.’

A.
1.

THE ‘TAKE’ OF LISTED SPECIES
Section 7 and 9 Species and Habitat Protections
Section 7 of the ESA is meant to protect listed species impacted by federal

actions. Specifically, the impact of the action is questioned as to whether it may actually
rise to the level of a ‘take,’ or destroy critical habitat.14 This ensures that the government
action does not cause ‘jeopardy.’ If it does, the project must be changed or its effects
mitigated to such a degree that ‘no jeopardy’ is the final outcome. Section 7 recognizes
the link between habitat protection and species conservation and mandates the
designation of critical habitat by the listing agency.15 Critical habitat is an essential
component for recovering and sustaining species populations.
The Section 9 ‘take’ provision is meant to protect listed species on what can be
seen on its face as protection for individual members of a species, however courts have
also interpreted Section 9 to apply to populations.16 Section 9 is based on wildlife law,
which intended to protect direct taking of animals by activities such as poaching and

13

16 U.S.C. § 1539.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
15
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
16
Cheever, Federico and Michael Balster, Symposium Article: The Take Prohibition in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act:
Contradictions, Ugly Ducklings, and Conservation of Species. 34 ENVTL. L. 363, 372 (2004). The authors state that looking at
populations is something courts have done when determining if future action can destroy habitat leading to a ‘take.’ There are no dead
fish in this analysis, only whether habitat modification will lead to future dead fish. This implies a population level analysis since a
diversion may cause harm over a long period of time rather than at one instance in time. [Hereinafter, CHEEVER AND BALSTER]
14

7

hunting.17 This would explain why some may see it only as a way to protect individual
species members.
2.

The Section 9 ‘Harm’ Regulation
Section 9 also applies to habitat modification with the inclusion of the word

‘harm’ as an action that can rise to the level of a ‘take.’ As ‘harm’ is not explicitly
defined in the statute, the USFWS developed a regulation, or ‘policy’ for the word in
1975:
‘Harm’ in the definition of ‘take’ in the Act means an act or omission which
actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as
to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but are not
limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification
or degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of ‘harm.’18
(Emphasis added).
The ‘harm’ regulation was re-defined in 1981, and remains the same today:
…[A]n act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering.19 (Emphasis added).
The US Supreme Court upheld the 1981 definition of ‘harm’ in Babbitt v. Sweet Home,20
and also upheld the premise of ‘take’ that includes both direct and indirect actions that
cause ‘harm.’21 The main holding by the Court in Sweet Home was that Congress
intended to give USFWS the authority to create policy consistent with the purpose of the
ESA in its definition of ‘harm.’22 A look at the 1981 Federal Register discussion shows
that the USFWS was concerned that the existing definition would allow any type of
17

Id. at 371.
46 F.R. 29490-01 (June 2, 1981). This Federal Register document is the proposed rule for changes to the harm regulation adopted
soon after on November 4, 1981. The proposed rule includes text of the existing harm rule established in 1975. Available at:
http://www.westlaw.com [Accessed 5 May 2005].
19
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
20
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, et. al. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
18
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habitat modification to rise to the level of ‘harm’ “…even where there was no injury to
the listed endangered or threatened wildlife.”23 This concern led to rewording ‘harm’ by
adding the word ‘actually’ twice, before ‘kills or injures wildlife,’ and removed
ambiguity in the original definition surrounding the last sentence, which appeared to
place ‘significant environmental modification or degradation’ on a separate level that
would require no proof.
One of the early cases that provoked this re-definition was Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land & Natural Resources.24 In this case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
found that destruction of woodland habitat by sheep and goats would ‘harm’ the Palila,
an endangered Hawaiian bird. The 9th Circuit ultimately upheld the district court opinion
that this ‘harm’ amounted to a Section 9 ‘take.’ The 1981 rule, proposed after the 9th
Circuit decision said, “Palila can be read as holding that habitat modification alone may
constitute ‘harm.’”25 By initiating rulemaking in 1981, using ‘harm’ to prove a Section 9
‘take’ was held to a greater standard of proof, which is what USFWS argued that it said
in the first place; however the rule change was necessary because the courts came to a
different interpretation.
This re-construction of ‘harm’ has led to the current policy governing how private
parties must act when habitat modification impacts endangered species. The federal
government has a different standard which looks at whether the project will cause

21

Babbitt v. Sweet Home 515 U.S. at 704.
515 U.S. at 708 (1995).
23
46 F.R. 54748 (November 4, 1981). Available at: http://www.westlaw.com [Accessed 5 May 2005].
24
Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff’d, 639 F. 2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
25
46 F.R. 29490-01, 29492 (June 2, 1981). In the last paragraph before the conclusion, the rule gets to the heart of the matter. “As the
result of the FWS overly broad definition of ‘harm,’ the Ninth Circuit decision in Palila erroneously supports the view that habitat
modifications alone may constitute ‘harm.’ The implications of such a decision are far-reaching. The discussion set forth above
indicates that the present definition of ‘harm,’ as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Palila, exceeds the statutory authority
conferred by Section 9 of the Act. Accordingly, we recommend that the Service clarify its definition to prevent the result reached in
Palila.” Available at: http://www.westlaw.com [Accessed 5 May 2005].
22
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‘jeopardy’ through its potential to cause a future ‘take’ of an endangered species. This
process is mandatory, and action cannot continue unless there are mitigation measures to
protect the species. With respect to private parties, there is no equivalent law that says a
person must enter into mandatory consultation prior to habitat modification where a listed
species is present. However, private parties modify habitat at their own risk and
potentially open themselves up to a lawsuit if they violate Section 9.
This distinction is important in the interpretation of ‘harm;’ what equates to
perceived ‘harm’ is mitigated under Section 7 to ensure “…‘agency action’ is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species…”26 Basically,
the federal government has no choice but to mitigate for its impacts on endangered
species. In contrast, ‘harm’ as interpreted by Section 9 for private parties (including the
government) must be an act that ‘actually kills or injures wildlife,’ placing a similar
burden on those who wish to challenge private parties. This burden of proof makes the
protection of habitat for endangered fish very complicated as most plaintiffs have gone
after the federal government due to the ‘no jeopardy’ standard, but few have dealt with
private irrigators whose impacts can be just as destructive.
This definition of ‘harm’ has created a great deal of controversy; when does
‘harm’ become a ‘take’? In the context of in-stream flows, an irrigator dewatering a
stream can cause enough ‘harm’ to rise to the level of a ‘take’ if that diversion causes
‘significant habitat modification.’ For example, drying up a stream will rise to the level of
a ‘take’ by stranding fish in disconnected pools, raising water temperature and increasing

26

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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the chance of predation. That same action can adversely impact ‘breeding, feeding or
sheltering’ by impeding those essential life functions. The fine line that irrigators walk is
how much diversion will ‘at least’ injure a fish, satisfying the ‘harm’ test.
Some questions that may help understand irrigator’s ESA liability include the
following: Will low streamflows ‘harm’ a fish if that harm is not directly noticeable, but
eventually impairs breeding, significantly reducing offspring? Does that constitute an
‘injury’ under the ‘harm’ definition since no fish were actually killed, just forced to
reproduce at a lower level? Court interpretations of ‘harm’ may hopefully answer these
types of questions.
3.

Federal Court Interpretation of ‘Harm’
In order to understand the liability borne by private irrigators, a look at case law

dealing with ‘harm’ both before and after Sweet Home is necessary. Section 9 case law
can be divided into either a post-action claim where the dead species is proof of a ‘take,’
or it can consist of an injunction to prevent future ‘take.’ The reason for the distinction is
due to the standard of proof. The finding of a ‘take’ requires a dead individual or
individuals, and can stop an action and result in large fines and possible jail time. An
injunction against future action has a different burden of proof because a ‘take’ has not
occurred, but is ‘reasonably certain’ and ‘imminent.’ These future ‘harm’ injunctions are
limited to stopping the proposed action and make up the majority of case law revolving
around ‘harm’ and Section 9 ‘take.’ This discussion will focus exclusively on injunctions
against future action as these holdings have the most promise for protecting listed fish
species.

11

a)

Successful Section 9 Injunctions
TVA v. Hill was one of the first cases to look at ‘harm’ after passage of the ESA.

The emphasis was on federal responsibility under Section 7 and referenced the early
‘harm’ language that was subsequently changed in 1981. The Court emphasized the
original Section 9 statement that “…significant environmental modification or
degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of ‘harm.’”27 This
statement had more relevance to scrutinizing federal actions under Section 7 because a
large federally funded dam would have harmed the endangered snail darter.
An important case in the interpretation of Section 9 ‘harm’ is Forest Conservation
Council v. Rosboro. In this case, the 9th Circuit reversed a district court decision that
interpreted the ESA as only applying to “past or current injury to a protected species,
unless the challenged action threatens that species with extinction.”28 The 9th Circuit
looked at the 1981 change in the ‘harm’ definition that emphasized the word ‘actually’
before ‘kills or injures wildlife.’ The court’s interpretation of the intent of the ‘harm’
regulation shows the injury does not have to have already happened, but can occur in the
future. Using the word ‘actually’ ensures the habitat modification must cause the death or
injury to be a ‘take.’ Its use was not intended to create a strict temporal element that only
applies after the act ‘actually’ occurs. This interpretation was found to be consistent with
other ESA cases tried prior to Rosboro.29 Also in Rosboro, the 9th Circuit came up with a
standard that was used in future court proceedings; for a successful injunction, the threat
must be ‘reasonably certain’ to cause ‘harm’ and the ‘harm’ must be ‘imminent.’ This

27

TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (FN 30) (1978).
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F. 3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1995).
29
See infra, note 45. American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F. 3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
28
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places a high standard of proof for cases that allege a future ‘take,’ which is consistent
with the ‘harm’ language in Section 9.
Sweet Home, which was briefly discussed above, does not fall directly into either
a successful or unsuccessful challenge under Section 9. This case is what is called a facial
challenge to the law as it is written. The Supreme Court found that ‘harm’ can be the
result of a direct action, or an indirect action such as habitat modification.30 The Court
then upheld the ‘harm’ regulation, and in doing so, maintained the practice of issuing
future injunctions when an action was found ‘reasonably certain’ and ‘imminent’ to
‘harm’ a listed species. This was done implicitly by recognizing the view held by the
Secretary of the Interior about the role of private parties in mitigating future action:
The Secretary…submits that the § 9 prohibition on takings, which Congress
defined to include ‘harm,’ places on respondents a duty to avoid harm that habitat
alteration will cause the birds unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant to
§ 10. The text of this act provides three reasons for concluding that the
Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable.31
How this might fit into injunctions against future ‘harm’ was recognized one year later in
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, when the 9th Circuit looked at the above language and
noted, “By finding this view reasonable, the Court approved an interpretation of the ESA
which prevents activity that will cause future harm.”32 Because private parties have a
duty to ensure habitat alteration will not cause future ‘harm,’ the use of injunctions
against those that choose not to use Section 10 to obtain an incidental take permit is
reasonable when there is proof that the threat is ‘reasonably certain’ and ‘imminent.’

30
Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700. The court refers to the incidental take provisions in Section 10 for private parties,
emphasizing the use of the word ‘incidental’ as Congressional intent for including indirect action. Within that discussion, the Court
held that Congress “had in mind foreseeable, rather than merely accidental effects on listed species.” This statement suggests that just
like Rosboro, the ‘harm’ definition is not limited to past or current injury when determining if an action will rise to the level of a
‘take.’
31
Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697.
32
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F. 3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), referring to Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697.
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In the concurring opinion in Sweet Home, Justice O’Connor discussed proximate
causation with reference to the addition of ‘actually’ in the definition of ‘harm:’
Indeed, by use of the word ‘actually,’ the regulation clearly rejects speculative or
conjectural effects, and thus itself invokes principles of proximate causation.33
In addition, O’Connor came up with a three-part test when determining ‘harm’.
In my view, then, the ‘harm’ regulation applies where significant habitat
modification, by impairing essential behaviors, proximately (foreseeably) causes
actual death or injury to identifiable animals that are protected under the
Endangered Species Act.34
This statement bolsters the idea that an action that will actually cause harm is necessary,
not speculation about whether the harm might occur in the future.
Some interesting questions were raised by the Supreme Court in how to construe
the ‘harm’ regulation. Quarles and Lundquist (2002) believe the outcome of Sweet Home
should make lower courts interpret future Section 9 cases in a narrow light. This would
make it difficult to prove a ‘take’ unless the harm or injury is essentially visible, which
implies a strict definition of causation towards an individual species member.35 Cheever
and Balster (2004) see it just the opposite since lower district and appellate courts have
consistently been more liberal in interpreting ‘harm’ both before and after Sweet Home
by focusing on population issues when the facts were relevant.36
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In Marbled Murrelet, the 9th Circuit said their decision in Rosboro was still good
after Sweet Home and reiterated that indirect harm through habitat modification is within
the statutory definition of ‘harm.’37 The appellants tried to use the word ‘actually’ to
mean harm that has already taken place but the 9th Circuit reminded them that in
Rosboro, the injury does not have to have occurred in the past and that the Supreme
Court did not overrule injunctions against future action. The 9th Circuit reiterates essential
components for an injunction by stating, “A reasonably certain threat of imminent harm
to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the
ESA.”38 Another issue that was raised is whether impaired breeding applies to individual
members of a species or larger populations. The appellants believed the Supreme Court
did not allow impaired breeding to apply to populations and that ‘harm’ only applied to
an individual member of the species. The 9th Circuit avoided making a determination on
that issue and stated that the question was avoided in Sweet Home.39 However, the 9th
Circuit did look at ‘harm’ to populations two years prior in National Wildlife Federation
v. Burlington Northern Railroad, which is discussed below.
Following these successful injunctions was House v. U.S. Forest Service. This
case used scientific evidence that showed habitat destruction through the removal of trees
would impact feeding and nesting of the Indiana bat. The district court found that this
action would constitute a Section 9 ‘take’ and issued an injunction against the US Forest
Service to halt tree harvesting.40 This ruling recognized previous decisions in Marbled
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Murrelet and American Bald Eagle (to be discussed) that allow an injunction before the
action occurred.
In Strahan v. Coxe, the Supreme Court upheld a district court opinion that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was liable for a Section 9 ‘take’ because granting
licenses to citizens for gillnet fishing resulted in injury to the Northern Right whale.41
With respect to ‘harm,’ the Northern Right whale was injured because it was shown that
some became tangled in fishing nets. Because ‘harm’ could be proven from a past action,
similar future action that might harm the Northern Right whale could be enjoined. This
case also deals with vicarious liability whereby the state was held liable for permits it
granted to fisherman, not the fisherman who inadvertently kill the whale. This poses an
interesting question as to whether states can be held liable for administering water rights.
Permitting an activity that may kill a listed fish species could make the state indirectly
liable for a Section 9 ‘take.’
b) Unsuccessful Section 9 Injunctions
Not all ESA ‘harm’ cases are successful in protecting listed species through an
injunction. This is mainly due to weak cases with poor scientific proof or evidence. In
Sierra Club v. Block, the plaintiff failed to get an injunction to protect the red-cockaded
woodpecker because of a lack of proof. The plaintiff used one abandoned site as evidence
and could not prove that logging caused the abandonment.42 For a successful case, more
sites would be necessary, as well as a study both before and after the logging to
determine the impacts.
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The district court in Morrill v. Lujan did not grant an injunction because there was
no proof that the Perdido beach mouse occupied the property in question. Although some
suitable habitat was identified, the plaintiff could offer no proof as to whether the habitat
was being actively used by the mouse. The plaintiff offered as evidence a mouse trapped
near the property, however, there was no evidence the mouse resided on the property. Six
years later there were sightings of mouse tracks on the property but the type of mouse
that made the tracks was unknown.43 The plaintiffs failed to establish a ‘causal’
connection between the destruction of habitat and harm to the beach mouse.44
Plaintiffs in American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti did not obtain an injunction due to
lack of scientific evidence proving that lead shotgun slugs used to kill deer would be
ingested by bald eagles feeding on un-recovered carcasses.45 This case resembled
National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel where an injunction was granted due to scientific
proof that eagles were poisoned with lead after feeding on duck carcasses.46 However, in
American Bald Eagle, the scientific proof was lacking and the allegation of future ‘harm’
was potential, not actual. The 1st Circuit states,
…courts have granted injunctive relief only where petitioners have shown that the
alleged activity has actually harmed the species or if continued will actually, as
opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species.47
This statement emphasizes the term ‘actually’ in the application of ‘harm’ that
encompasses both past and future action. The 9th Circuit in Rosboro cited this
distinction in its ruling, creating consistency at the appellate level.
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In National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern Railroad, the 9th Circuit
upheld a district court decision “that NWF had failed to establish ‘the possibility’ of
irreparable injury as a result of the BN's past violation of the ESA.”48 What caused the
alleged taking was an accident, and the railroad took extensive steps to mitigate its
actions to ensure no bears would be ‘taken’ in the future. The 9th Circuit found this
mitigation precluded the NWF assertion that the cause of the accident leading to ‘take’ of
a few bears would lead to ‘irreparable injury.’ And further, “we do require that a future
injury be sufficiently likely.”49 This language shows that speculation about a future injury
is not sufficient to issue an injunction. Also raised was the issue of ‘significant habitat
modification’ within the Section 9 ‘harm’ language. Expert opinion showed the harm was
‘localized’ and did not affect bears within the entire ecosystem, and that the ‘long term
overall effect’ was negligible.50 The 9th Circuit essentially interpreted ‘significant habitat
modification’ as an action having a long term effect on a larger population rather than a
localized impact on a few individuals.
One of the first cases after Sweet Home where an injunction was denied due to
lack of scientific proof was Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA. Initially, the plaintiffs failed
to prove a particular snake actually resided on the land in question but that it might
potentially occupy it.51 Also, based on the facts, “a reasonably certain threat of imminent
harm” was not proven to the court. The Hawksbill Sea Turtle was also included in the
‘harm’ analysis and again, the district court denied an injunction. The court held that even
if one food source were to be damaged, the turtles could find food elsewhere. Plus, the
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court wanted to see dead turtles or a study that showed a decrease in population in
response to the construction.52 The court recognized that future injunctive relief is
possible within the existing law; however the proof was not comprehensive enough in the
eyes of the court to issue an injunction. The response by the court to the plaintiffs made it
appear that the burden of proof was so high that only a showing of past injury would
satisfy the court.
In Coastside Habitat Coalition v. Prime Properties, the district court used
language in both Rosboro and Marbled Murrelet to determine if an injunction was
warranted. Specifically, the court asked if the two species in question were located on the
property and if developing the property is “…reasonably certain to constitute a threat of
imminent harm…”53 The expert on the listed snake found that it only inhabited the
conservation easement portion of the property, which is protected from development. The
finding was the same for the Red-Legged Frog in that it was only found on the
conservation easement portion of the property and not on the portion to be developed. In
addition, suitable habitat was identified only within the conservation easement.54 Because
the snake and frog were not in the area to be developed, the court found that harm was
not ‘imminent’ or ‘reasonably certain’ to occur. The denial of an injunction shows that
suitable habitat must be occupied. If not, then the courts cannot look to the next step
because in light of the facts, it would be unnecessary to do so.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal is one of the most recent examples of a failed ESA
injunction. In this case, a school district was taken to court because the proposed location
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of a high school was to be built in an area designated as critical habitat for the cactus
ferruginous pygmy-owl. The school was to only be built on 2/3 of the property with 1/3
remaining undeveloped, consisting primarily of arroyos.55
In its analysis, the 9th Circuit reiterates that,
Harming a species may be indirect, in that the harm may be caused by habitat
modification, but habitat modification does not constitute harm unless it ‘actually
kills or injures wildlife.’56
The 9th Circuit uses Sweet Home, Rosboro and Marbled Murrelet to justify the use of
injunctions against future action, if it can be proven that action will ‘actually kill or injure
wildlife.’57 The 9th Circuit upheld the district court ruling that pygmy-owls would not be
‘taken’ during school construction because they only occupy the arroyos in the
undeveloped habitat. Also, increased human activity on the developed portion of the site
will not cause harm to a degree that it warrants a ‘take.’58
This case has a holding similar to Coastside Habitat Coalition in that in order for
there to be a case for harm, the species must occupy some portion of the potentially
altered habitat. If not, then a case would be almost impossible to prove.
c)

Specific ‘Harm’ Cases for Fish
The cases discussed above refer to a variety of species found in the US including

birds, amphibians and mammals. To gain an understanding of how this may apply to
irrigators, holdings from specific cases that deal with fish species will be analyzed in
order to understand the similarities and differences between fish and non-fish cases due
to the variation in habitat, and the nature of the habitat modification.
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Not many ESA cases involving fish and private irrigators have been tried. Most
cases look at large federal irrigation projects operated primarily by the US Bureau of
Reclamation, however some have holdings that can help in this analysis. Pyramid Lake v.
U.S. Navy involves a federal action where the US Navy leased land to private citizens for
irrigated agriculture. The US Navy holds the water right and delivers it to the local
irrigation district. The irrigation district diverts this water from the Truckee River, which
flows into Pyramid Lake and is the home to the endangered Cui-ui fish.59 It is understood
that flows into the lake are lower due to the diversion, which in turn reduces the volume
of the lake and the amount of habitat available to the fish. The low flows and the low lake
level also make it difficult for the fish to spawn.60
This case was decided before Sweet Home upheld the ‘harm’ definition, but is
important because it had to answer whether a federal action amounts to ‘jeopardy’ under
Section 7 or ‘harm’ under Section 9. The 9th Circuit determined that in this case, both
jeopardy and ‘harm’ were somewhat similar and in its affirmation of the district court
opinion that the action did not cause ‘jeopardy,’ it also did not amount to ‘harm’ under
Section 9.61 The 9th Circuit recognized that the appellant (tribe) had their own diversion
on the river and there was not enough proof that the Navy’s diversion was at fault
because other users of the river (including the tribe) were not distinguished from the
Navy’s use.62
Pyramid Lake is problematic because it shows that all users on a watercourse may
have to be enjoined in a lawsuit in order to distinguish between each user who may be at
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fault. In essence, they all could be at fault, or would it be the one closest to where the
river discharges to the lake? Could it also be the one who uses the most water from the
river? To be consistent with prior appropriation, maybe the most junior users should be
shut off to leave more water in-stream. ‘Harm’ may be difficult to prove due to the many
users of the shared ‘habitat’ relied on by the fish.
In United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, a few important holdings
address how the ESA can affect private irrigators.63 In this case, an irrigation district was
found to be ‘taking’ endangered salmon. An injunction was issued to stop the diversion
during the time-period when the fish migrated downstream. The irrigation district
challenged the authority of the federal ‘take’ language because California had a similar
state ESA plan that had ‘take’ language. The district court found the state language was
‘less protective’ and therefore used the federal ‘take’ language in Section 9. The court
also said that state water rights do not ‘prevail’ over the ESA. The ESA allows states to
develop their own endangered species act, however it must be just as protective, or more
protective as the federal ESA.
One of the more important holdings in this case has to do with the property
interest in a water right. The court stated that complying with the ESA did not lead to
confiscation of water rights, it only affects how the district ‘exercises those rights.’64 This
statement attempts to deflect the question of whether an injunction to stop the irrigation
district from irrigating amounts to a 5th Amendment ‘taking’ of private property. Because
the injunction only affects use of the rights for a specific time period, and the government
is not claiming a water right, a property ‘taking’ claim would be unsuccessful.
63
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The 2001 case of Arizona Cattle Growers v. USFWS helped clarify some of the
harm regulation with actions that may impact endangered species. The case has to do
specifically with land use activities that can impact both endangered fish and animals.
The 9th Circuit found that the Biological Opinion issued by USFWS was arbitrary and
capricious because for most of the species it tried to include, there was not enough data to
show that the species actually resided within that area.65 The main argument regarding
Section 9 ‘take’ was how USFWS was interpreting both Section 7 and Section 9. USFWS
thought that Section 7 should allow a taking “…in which harm to a listed species was
‘possible’ or ‘likely’ in the future due to the proposed action.”66 The 9th Circuit re-iterated
its previous holdings that a taking applied via Section 7 and Section 9 has the same
meaning, and that the act causing ‘harm’ must ‘actually kill or injure wildlife’ and be
‘significant.’67 The 9th Circuit basically told the USFWS that a vague interpretation
through Section 7 would be inconsistent with the purposes of the ESA by ignoring
Section 9. Although this case had nothing to do with using water directly from a stream
for irrigation, Arizona Cattle Growers shows the Appellate courts have tried to remain
consistent in their interpretation of Section 9 of the ESA.
A recent case that has the best example of ‘harm’ liability for private irrigators is
Idaho Watersheds Project (IWP) v. Jones. This case looks specifically at how operating
an irrigation diversion can constitute harm under Section 9. In IWP v. Jones, an
environmental group successfully proved to the district court, “…that the Joneses’
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diversion poses a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to the bull trout.”68 The
court gave IWP a permanent injunction against the Joneses’ diversion, forcing them to
ensure 1) that bull trout are not diverted into the ditch, and 2) that the bull trout can
migrate past their diversion.69 The major factors that could lead to harm were outlined
through expert testimony from a biologist, not refuted by the defendants. The expert
found that “the diversion is a migration barrier that ‘has the risk of reducing the
population through the loss of future eggs.’”70 In this case, the diversion can dewater the
stream to a point where bull trout could not migrate to their spawning grounds. Also, fish
are likely to be injured or killed because the diversion is not suitable habitat; it moves the
bull trout to a different creek where they are hindered from migrating back to their native
creek, and exposes the fish to a steep and rocky drop.71
The district court used tests in the most recent holding by the 9th Circuit in Bernal
to confirm that the threat is ‘reasonably certain’ and ‘imminent.’72 In the irrigator’s
defense, they raised the issue that IWP did not have long-term stream flow data or
population studies to determine the past and future status of the bull trout in response to
the irrigation diversion. The court looked to Marbled Murrelet for guidance and
determined that “Future harm to a species need not be shown with certainty before a
permanent injunction may issue, but mere speculation will not suffice.”73 The court
determined that relatively recent evidence is enough to issue an injunction, understanding
that it could take many years to fully understand the behavior of the bull trout, and that
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the bull trout may be in serious jeopardy by the time a long-term study is completed. On
the subject of speculation, expert testimony coupled with a biological assessment was
enough for the court to determine that this action was not speculation but based on best
available science. This conclusion of future ‘harm’ is consistent with the USFWS
definition that the diversion must be a ‘significant habitat modification’ that will ‘kill or
injure wildlife by significantly impairing…breeding.’74
IWP v. Jones followed the federal courts affirmation that an ‘imminent threat’ of
future harm must be shown in order to allow an injunction to prevent a future ‘take’ of
fish. This applies to both irrigators involved with federal projects and those who are not.
Successful challenges must pass the two tests used by the courts: The threat must be
‘reasonably certain,’ and ‘imminent.’ As was shown in IWP v. Jones, a comprehensive
understanding of how fish use a stream is not necessary. An expert opinion using the best
available science can assess ‘at that moment’ whether the irrigation diversion may cause
a ‘take.’
However, in a recent unpublished opinion, the 9th Circuit reversed the district
court’s injunction and remanded the case to be re-heard by the district court.75 What
appears to be the strongest reason for the reversal was that the 9th Circuit did not believe
that there was a likelihood of future harm because there were no proven past harm. In the
appellate opening brief, plaintiff-appellees’ response brief, and appellants’ response brief,
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both parties essentially argued about the validity of the expert witnesses and the lack of
scientific certainty about the population dynamics of the bull trout.76
This case, although reversed by the 9th Circuit, has the most potential for defining
the relationship between private irrigators and listed fish species. Because the case was
remanded to the district court for reconsideration, different conclusions may fall out that
will hopefully clarify the standard of ‘harm’ and the amount of scientific evidence needed
to determine what is a ‘reasonably certain threat of imminent harm.’77
d) Summary of Case Holdings
The holdings by the US District, Appellate and Supreme Courts with regards to
the definition of ‘harm’ in the Endangered Species Act create a set of conditions that
must be met for a successful injunction. The conditions are as follows:
1) The species must be present on the property in question. This points to behavior
that includes breeding, nesting and feeding to name a few. Because someone saw
wildlife on the property does not automatically make that property suitable
habitat.
2) If a species resides on the property in a portion that is not to be developed, the
development can likely go forward, unless it can be proven that work on the
portion adjacent to the occupied habitat can cause ‘harm.’
3) Habitat modification must be reasonably certain to cause imminent harm.
Another test is that the habitat modification is sufficiently likely to cause injury.78
4) Scientific proof for ‘harm’ does not have to consist of many years of research, and
can be based on short-term studies that can prove harm through the legal
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principles stated in 3 and 4. A scientific inference however, can not be
speculative.
5) Significant habitat modification can mean an action that has a long term effect on
a larger population rather than just a localized impact on a few individuals.
6) If there is potentially more than one party causing harm, it is up to the plaintiff to
make the case for who should be held responsible by differentiating between
those that are the most ‘proximate’ to the cause.
These conditions provide a summary of relevant case law developed to decipher
the ‘harm’ regulation. The list represents current holdings from good case law that could
be used to determine a private irrigator’s ESA liability. However, some of these points
may be overruled or become irrelevant as new cases arise, current decisions are appealed,
or if Congress decides to modify the ESA.

IV.

The Implication of ESA ‘Harm’ Case Law on Irrigators
What do these federal court rulings mean for the relationship between endangered

fish and private irrigators? How can it be shown that their diversion may cause enough
‘harm’ to be a ‘take’? The answer to these questions starts with an understanding of the
differences between land and water-based habitats, as it is these differences that have
defined existing case law. A hypothetical example is then used to show the strengths and
limitations in ESA case law when applied to private irrigators. Finally, the role of
injunctions will be explored.

A.

HABITAT AS FLOWING WATER
There are many differences between habitat for dry-land species and aquatic

species such as fish. The habitat for fish is constantly flowing water within a channel, and
the water must be of a sufficient quantity to allow fish to survive. Reduced flows within
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the channel decrease the volume of water, and sometimes quality, therefore resulting in a
reduction or impairment of habitat. This occurs naturally due to seasonal and long-term
climate variation; however, the use of water for irrigated agriculture that comes directly
out of streams reduces flows even more than under natural conditions.
This difference between aquatic and terrestrial habitat has to do with both spatial
and temporal components unique to that habitat. For a parcel of land, the habitat is
relatively static, with changes occurring naturally over time due to competition between
plants and climate change. For a stream, the habitat is always ‘moving,’ and covers
considerably less area than habitat available for use by migratory birds. For example, the
volume in a stream is in a constant state of flux with high flows occurring at certain times
of the year and low flows during others. Land-based species survive by breathing oxygen
while fish survive by utilizing oxygen through water. In cases where habitat is destroyed
on land, the species may still be able to breathe even though its food sources and
breeding areas have been destroyed. For fish, dewatering of a stream can also destroy
both its food sources and breeding areas, and it has the added effect of potentially
suffocating the fish because without water, the fish can not live. Lakes are also used by
fish and changes to lake volume or water quality can have an impact on survival. These
differences in what makes up habitat have been incorporated into our legal system, which
further differentiates how land-based and aquatic habitats can be used.

B.

APPLYING ‘HARM’ CASE LAW TO A HYPOTHETICAL PRIVATE IRRIGATOR
To understand how Section 9 case law can be applied to an irrigator, one could

look at the opinion in IWP v. Jones, despite the fact that the case is still evolving and
could end up with a different holding. For this example, let’s assume there is one irrigator
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and no other man-made influences will impact the stream. The irrigator uses a simple
gravity drained canal system to irrigate his fields. The head gate for his diversion is
located on the main-stem of the stream adjacent to prime spawning grounds for an
endangered fish. This creek typically receives large amounts of runoff from mountain
snows through the spring and early summer, however summers are typically dry with
little rainfall to augment these flows. For the past few years, mountain snowfall has been
very low and runoff in the late summer/early fall has subsequently been low. The
endangered fish uses gravel beds below the diversion for spawning in the early fall, and
typically migrates downstream to larger portions of the river in the winter and spring
months. A neighbor knows these fish are endangered and is concerned that the diversion
may dewater the stream where the fish spawn. The neighbor (plaintiff) takes the irrigator
to court to get an injunction against future action (diverting water) by the irrigator,
because he believes the habitat modification will ultimately harm the fish, leading to a
‘take.’
1.

Condition One – Is the Fish Present?
In this case, what would the plaintiff need for a successful injunction? First, using

the summary of case holdings in Section III. D., the plaintiff would need to prove the fish
exists on the habitat in question. Now, in the case of private irrigators, there is no listed
critical habitat in this area because the stream and diversion are on private property.
Critical habitat can only be regulated when it is on federal land. In addition, a report by
the listing agency says that irrigation diversions may be a factor in the species decline.
Figure 1 will help outline the necessary conditions to determine if the fish is present.
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Figure 1 – Hypothetical stream system with a single irrigation diversion located above a potential
spawning bed.

To determine if the fish is present, there must be visual proof by an expert,
namely a fish biologist that works for the federal government, or a consultant. If the
expert can conclude that the fish does in fact breed adjacent to the irrigation diversion,
then that helps the plaintiff’s argument. The best argument would include some years of
scientific studies that would show a decline in population, or physical evidence that the
diversion is creating an impassable ‘defecit.’ As raised on appeal by the defendantsappellants in IWP v. Jones, the fact that the diversion was operating for 40 years, and that
fish were seen both below and above the diversion shows that more scientific analysis
should have been focused on the time period when flows are typically low and the bull
trout starts migrating upstream to spawn. A good understanding of the river hydrology
would also help because it becomes more difficult to prove that the diversion causes harm
a significant distance above or below a stream due to the fact that the stream may be
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either gaining in a certain reach, replacing water taken out by the irrigator, or losing,
where the stream is naturally drying up.
2.

Condition Two – Is the Entire Habitat Used by the Species?
The second condition regarding modification on part of the habitat not used by an

endangered species would have different standards for an aquatic species compared to a
terrestrial species. As shown below in Figure 2, if the irrigator diverts 10 cubic feet per
second (cfs), the diversion will have an impact on the habitat the fish needs for spawning.
As discussed in Coastside Habitat Coalition,79 and Bernal,80 for real property, only
developing a portion of land that is not considered habitat critical to the survival of the
species would likely avoid any harm. In the case of a migrating fish, it is acceptable to
divert some water up to the point where it does not impact the quantity of quality of water
needed by the fish for survival. However, when a diversion takes enough water past that
point that will actually injure or kill the fish, it should be enough to warrant an injunction.
This would be legally sufficient only during those times when the fish is migrating,
spawning or is found to inhabit that area. In this case, a longer injunction would be
necessary until the fish moves to another portion of its habitat.
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15 cfs
Spawning
Bed
10 cfs
necessary

Irrigated Field
Diversion
10 cfs

5 cfs
deficit

Figure 2 – In this scenario, some water is diverted, but there is a deficit that can hinder successful
spawning. (cfs – cubic feet per second).

3.

Condition Three – Will Habitat Modification Cause Imminent Harm?
The third condition, whether an action must be ‘reasonably certain to cause

imminent harm,’ or is ‘sufficiently likely’ to cause injury, is determined by an expert,
most likely a fisheries biologist. This wording is likely to apply when it is obvious to the
scientist, who then makes it obvious to the court, that unless the action is stopped ‘right
away,’ the action will cause enough ‘harm’ to be a Section 9 ‘take.’ In the hypothetical
situation shown in Figure 2, this would apply if the fish were about to come up to the
creek and the diversion was taking enough water to hinder spawning. This would have to
be observable or highly likely if it is known that the diversion will dewater the stream.
The action will likely not cause ‘harm’ if stream flows are sufficient (Figure 3), therefore
an argument for an injunction during high flows would be an example of speculation.
This example shows how climate can shape the argument; one year water flows are
sufficient and the fish is not threatened, however the next year, the same amount of water

79
80

Coastside Habitat Coalition v. Prime Properties, 1998 WL 231024 No. C 97-4025 (N.D. Cal. April 30, 1998) Unpublished opinion.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F. 3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).
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used by the irrigator can cause harm. What determines ‘reasonably certain to cause
imminent harm,’ or is ‘sufficiently likely’ to cause injury, would have to be looked at on
a case by case basis with the plaintiff having the burden of proof to show the action will
cause or is causing harm.

20 cfs
Spawning
Bed
10 cfs
necessary

Irrigated Field
Diversion
5 cfs

15 cfs
Figure 3 – In this scenario, some water is diverted, but enough is available for the fish to successfully
spawn. (cfs – cubic feet per second).

There is a fine line between having enough scientific evidence to determine if
there is enough harm to give cause for an injunction, and whether that evidence is
speculative and subsequently rejected by the court. It is only fair to the irrigator that the
expert actually visit the site in question and make a determination based on that specific
locale instead of basing their opinion on region-wide observations. As shown in IWP v.
Jones, the plaintiff’s expert may understand the general population dynamics better than
small-scale interactions, however scientific certainty based on the diversion in question is
the only way to find an ‘imminent threat.’
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4.

Condition Four – Is the Science Speculative or Sound?
IWP v. Jones shows that scientific proof does not have to be well established in

order to issue an injunction;81 however, it cannot be speculative. Part of the reason the 9th
Circuit overturned the decision was due to scientific uncertainty. Although, if that much
certainty and more time is needed to figure it out, the fish may potentially become extinct
while being studied. The courts realize that type of outcome would be contrary to the
purposes of the ESA, which is to sustain and recover endangered species. In the
hypothetical situation, the plaintiff would need a fisheries biologist that understands the
potential threats to breeding due to a lack of water. This research must be scientifically
valid and be able to apply directly to the fish in question. This research could be based on
how the same fish has fared in similar streams and conditions, or better yet, from a recent
study in that specific location. If longer-term information is available, that would make
an even greater case for the plaintiff.
5.

Condition Five – Are Protections for an Individual Species or Population?
The fifth condition looks at protecting both individuals and the greater population.

An injunction against future action applies mainly to protecting future populations of the
fish as the exact amount that could be taken due to stream dewatering is unknown. In
addition, the ‘harm’ definition protects fish from actions that would hinder reproduction,
which would in effect lower the total population. The influence of wildlife law on the
ESA left its mark with those believing that a ‘take’ only applies to individuals of the
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Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, Civ. No. 00-0730-E-BLW at 17 (D. Idaho Nov. 14, 2002), citing Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific
Lumber Company, 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1367 (9th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 83 F. 3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996).
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species;82 however the ESA specifically states that it is to conserve threatened and
endangered species and the ecosystems they depend on,83 with no mention of only
protecting individuals. In National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern Railroad it
appears that the court interpreted significant habitat modification as an action that can
have a long-term effect on population. This implies that dead fish would be necessary to
prove a ‘take’ because an injunction for future harm would have to potentially injure a
large number of individuals, therefore significantly reducing future populations. Looking
at IWP v. Jones, there is no mention of either individuals or population, just the
accusation that continued irrigation will harm the bull trout. In this case, biologic studies
have identified that bull trout populations are declining due to ‘migratory barriers’84 such
as irrigation diversions. The diversion in IWP v. Jones had the potential to be a migratory
barrier and was seen as one piece of the puzzle causing population decline. However in
order to protect the population, the individual species member must also be protected and
the expert witness did not present a strong case that looked at individual bull trout.
With the hypothetical situation, the court may look at whether the alleged action
that will cause a ‘take’ is one of the actions identified in the initial listing documents as
causing a decline in population. That action may fall under ‘significant habitat
modification’ because the action in general was identified as an original factor in leading
to a threatened or endangered designation. What needs to be discussed by the expert and
made clear to the court is that there is no distinction between populations and individuals
in the eyes of the ESA. The reason is that many individuals make up the entire

82
See QUARLES AND LUNDQUIST, supra note 35 at 225. The authors go to great lengths to try and point out that ‘harm’ only applies to
individuals and that actions that “reduce[ing] breeding success rate at the population level is not take.”
83
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1).
84
Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, Civ. No. 00-0730-E-BLW at 7 (D. Idaho Nov. 14, 2002).
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‘population’ of that species. Any reduction of individuals reduces the population, and
any reduction in the general population reduces the amount of individuals.
6.

Condition Six – How Many Parties are Potentially Involved?
This analysis becomes much more difficult when there are many irrigators on a

stream system (Figure 4). Many have argued about applying the notion of causation,
which deals with proximity and alternative liability,85 and it is important to note that this
idea is being explored as another way to assign liability in future ESA cases. Rasband
(2003) devotes an entire paper on this subject and the appropriateness of using tort law
concepts in concert with enforcement of the ESA.86
Another issue that complicates situations with multiple users occurs when the
stream system has not been adjudicated. In this situation, it may be difficult to prove
exactly which diversion is causing the harm. In an adjudication, the courts are left to
determine the validity of water rights and the relationship of one right to another. To say
one irrigator is responsible out of 50 on an un-adjudicated stream would pose serious
problems to a potential plaintiff. The plaintiff may have to enjoin all fifty irrigators to
make a strong case as it may focus attention between irrigators by trying to prove who is
more ‘proximate.’ This action may also have the inadvertent effect of starting a general
stream adjudication or end up charging all the irrigators if the one whose diversion has
caused the most harm cannot be found. This is an example of the appropriateness of using
tort law to try and apportion liability between irrigators.
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See generally Rasband, James R., Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA
Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers. 33 ENVTL. L. 595 (2003), Glen, Alan M., and
Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree. 16 FALL NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 (2001), and
Bricker, Jennie L., and David E. Filippi, Endangered Species Act Enforcement and Western Water Law. 30 ENVTL. L. 735 (2000).
86
See generally RASBAND, supra note 85.
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One way to address the causation issue is to look at the language of the ESA
where it ‘mandates’ cooperation between the listing agencies and the states.87 This
implies cooperation with an individual state’s water right apportionment system. In the
West, it would be the prior appropriation doctrine. During times of shortage, the senior
water users are satisfied first, then junior users. Imposing a ‘regulatory’ drought to keep
water in-stream for ESA listed fish species can follow a similar path where senior
irrigators are satisfied first, then juniors if any water is left. This idea would fall within
congressional intent. However, this would become more complicated if only one junior
user on the stream entered into a Section 10 HCP. That user would expect to receive
water because they were proactive in reducing their liability by leaving more water instream. It would be a disincentive to punish the irrigator that took steps to leave more
water in-stream through a priority call when a senior irrigator did nothing to mitigate
their water diversion.

Junior
20 cfs

Junior
15 cfs

5 cfs
deficit

70 cfs
Senior
30 cfs

Spawning
bed 10 cfs
necessary

Figure 4 – Hypothetical stream system where there are many diversions with different priority dates. (cfs –
cubic feet per second).

Figure 4 shows a hypothetical stream system with three irrigators that have
different priority dates. The senior irrigator takes the most water and is located upstream
87

16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(2).
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of the two junior irrigators. The scenario shows that all three irrigators have the potential
to dewater the stream to a point where ‘harm’ may occur to a fish because there is not
enough water for it to successfully spawn. The question then becomes, who should be
shut off to leave water in-stream? Should it be the junior irrigator closest to the spawning
bed because he is the most ‘proximate’? This would fall in line with prior appropriation
because the senior user should be satisfied first during times of drought. Application of a
‘regulatory’ drought could do the same thing. This argument would become more
complicated if the senior irrigator was the closest to the spawning bed. Should prior
appropriation still be followed by cutting off the junior users until there is enough water
in the stream? Or, should the senior user be held responsible because her diversion is the
most ‘proximate’ to the spawning bed. These questions make determining fault and
apportioning liability a difficult task. The policy of the listing agencies (USFWS and
NOAA Fisheries) is for proportionate reductions, as discussed by Bricker and Filippi
(2000).88 This method would ignore applying ‘regulatory’ droughts that would follow
prior appropriation, and instead group all water users together and ask or enforce a
proportionate reduction among all users regardless of proximity or seniority.

C.

INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FUTURE ACTION
The issuance of an injunction is an acknowledgement that a ‘take’ will more

likely than not occur due to the proposed action. This tool carries significant weight as it
has the power to stop an action for an indefinite amount of time until that action is
mitigated. The correct mitigation as articulated by the Supreme Court in Sweet Home

88

See BRICKER AND FILIPPI, supra note 85 at 756, referencing 15 C.F.R. § 904.107 (1999) and 64 F.R. 60,727, 60,730 (November 8,
1999).
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would entail entering into a Section 10 Habitat Conservation Plan.89 An injunction does
not carry the significant penalties under Section 11 for civil and criminal violations,90
however its reach can impact seemingly lawful activities that result in habitat
modification and can be seen as a preliminary step that acts as a ‘warning’ to the habitat
modifier; if these actions continue, the habitat modifier can face monetary fines and/or
incarceration.
An added dimension that may eventually be used by lower courts are concepts of
tort law in the context of a Section 9 ‘take,’ whether the result is an injunction against
future action, or assessment of a civil penalty when it can be shown that habitat
modification had already killed or injured a fish. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home, Justice
O’Connor stated “…private parties should be held liable under § 1540(a)(1) [civil
penalties] only if their habitat-modifying actions proximately cause death or injury to
protected animals,”91 and that this task should be decided by lower courts.92 As stated by
the Supreme Court, there is a place for causation for activities that have occurred after the
fact, since a civil penalty can only be assessed when a ‘take’ has already occurred.
Relevant case law is not entirely clear on how to obtain a successful injunction through
the ‘reasonably certain to cause imminent harm’ standard developed by the courts to
prevent future action, and especially in situations where there are many irrigators on a

89
The Supreme Court states “The Secretary…submits that the § 9 prohibition on takings, which Congress defined to include ‘harm,’
places on respondents a duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will cause the birds unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant
to § 10. The text of this act provides three reasons for concluding that the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable.” Babbitt v. Sweet
Home, 515 U.S. at 697 (1995). Later, the court refers directly to Section 10 and HCPs. “The permit process requires the applicant to
prepare a ‘conservation plan’ that specifies how he intends to ‘minimize and mitigate’ the ‘impact of his activity on endangered and
threatened species, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A), making it clear that Congress had in mind foreseeable rather than merely accidental
effects on listed species.” Emphasis added. Sweet Home at 700. These statements by the Supreme Court allude to the fact that any
action by a private party that has the potential to impact a listed species must ‘avoid harm’ through the Section 10 HCP process. This
parallels the Section 7 ‘no jeopardy’ clause that is mandatory for government projects, however only encouraged in the private sphere
as a ‘duty to avoid harm.’
90
16 U.S.C. § 1540.
91
Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 712 (1995). Referring to Section 11 of the ESA.
92
Id. at 713.
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stream system rather than the one irrigator in IWP v. Jones.93 More than likely, the
standard of proof for future injunctions will be developed on a case-by-case basis.
Hopefully future decisions will create more certainty about what is ‘reasonably certain to
cause imminent harm.’
Despite the lack of specific case law for private irrigators, existing case law for
other ESA cases surrounding ‘harm’ can potentially be applied to private irrigators for
habitat modification that violates the Section 9 ‘take’ prohibitions. The above example
was simplistic, however it lays the foundation for a successful argument against private
irrigators whose habitat modification can amount to enough ‘harm’ to equal a ‘take.’ The
Court in Sweet Home emphasized the use of Section 10 to reduce the liability for private
irrigators. I propose that New Mexico irrigators should use this tool to help reduce their
federal ESA liability. This option gives private irrigators the opportunity to help improve
habitat for listed fish species. As the above examples and hypothetical situation point out,
an educated citizen can force a private irrigator to stop their diversion. In New Mexico,
the water code does not have protections for listed fish species as in-stream flows are
relatively non-existent. In addition, the state does not have programs in place to try and
get more water in stream to help listed fish species. This lack of state support will only
force irrigators to look for federal relief under Section 10 or fend for themselves against
potential citizen suits that can threaten their state-issued water right.

93
In IWP v. Jones, only one irrigator was involved in activities that could rise to the level of a future take. It was obvious that only one
diversion could cause harm making a causation analysis pointless. If there were other diversions by many irrigators, the court would
have had to take a closer look at which diversion might cause the harm and determine fault among the multiple ‘tortfeasors.’
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V.

Reducing Irrigator’s ESA Liability through Section 10
Just as federal actions are mitigated to prevent jeopardy to a listed species through

a Section 7 consultation, Section 10 provides a similar vehicle for habitat modifications
not tied to federal actions. As a Section 7 consultation and mitigation is mandatory for
federal actions, Section 10 mitigation by a private irrigator is optional and carried out at
their own expense. This raises a question of risk vs. cost for the irrigator. If there is a gray
area surrounding an action that may or may not cause a ‘take,’ how should an irrigator
proceed?94
With regards to irrigators, the gray area is substantial because their actions are
more likely to cause a Section 9 ‘take’ under the ‘harm’ definitions due to the nature of
irrigation diversions. These diversions do not necessarily kill instantaneously but can
indirectly kill fish by significantly altering the aquatic habitat, which can impair breeding,
lead to mortality, and reduce fish populations. Case law developed before and after Sweet
Home allows for an injunction against future action by irrigators if there is sufficient
proof to show that the diversion will cause harm.
In New Mexico, many streams support fish that can survive on very low flows
common to arid and semi-arid rivers. However when people put that water to use, there is
a greater likelihood a diversion will adversely impact fish habitat than a diversion in the
Pacific Northwest where water is relatively abundant, therefore allowing for more
irrigation before adversely affecting fish. Case law and the not-so perennial nature of
New Mexico streams should give irrigators a clear picture that their actions will likely
94
Ruhl, J. B., How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real
Estate Development. 5 ENVTL. L. 345, 357 (1999). Ruhl states “…when the effects of a project are not clearly a ‘take’ or ‘no-take’
situation: should an HCP permit be sought, thus gaining the certainty of legal authorization of take at the price of regulatory
entanglements, or does the benefit of not having to undertake the permit process justify the risk of going forward without a permit?”
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amount to a Section 9 ‘take.’ To reduce their future liability, New Mexico irrigators
should apply for a Section 10 HCP.

A.

SECTION 10, GENERALLY
Section 10 has an incidental take provision similar to the federal Section 7

version. It was added in 1982 to codify a process for non-federal habitat modifiers that
work to protect listed species.95 A handbook was developed to assist those seeking a legal
remedy for their habitat modifying activities.96 The authorized ‘take’ can only be
incidental in nature, stemming from an otherwise lawful activity,97 which is similar to
what the federal government follows in Section 7. A necessary provision before
approving a HCP is that the applicant must show that the project will be funded.98 The
public also gets a chance to comment on the HCP prior to its final issuance.99 Because
approval of a HCP is a federal ‘green light’ to commence habitat modification, a section
7 consultation is mandatory.100 Depending on the size of the project, it may require an
environmental assessment (EA) or a more comprehensive Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS),101 which would likely be paid for by the applicant. This appears to get
complicated and more expensive depending on the proposed habitat modification.
However, this is one of a few options available to irrigators that want to continue to
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Kalen, Sam, An Overview of Section 10 in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 287 (Donald C. Baur and
William Robert Irvin, eds. 2002).
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US Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE
PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK (Nov. 1996) 61 F.R. 63,854 (1996); 64 F.R. 11,485 (March 9, 1999). [Hereinafter, HCP
HANDBOOK].
97
Id. at 1-2.
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Id. at 7-3.
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Id. at 6-20.
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Id. at 3-15.
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Id. at 5-1.
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irrigate and reduce their ESA liability. As an incentive for voluntary cooperation, besides
covering the species in question, the HCP may cover species not yet listed.102
The HCP must predict how many of the listed species will be incidentally taken as
a result of these actions. This can be done by calculating it in terms of “numbers of
animals ‘killed, harmed, or harassed’” or by “habitat acres or other appropriate habitat
units (e.g., acre-feet of water) to be affected generally or…where the specific number of
individuals is unknown or indeterminable.”103 A HCP can also be tailored to protect
habitat or mitigate for its loss.104 This condition shows that both individuals or the greater
population that they belong to can be looked at in a HCP.

B.

HOW CAN SECTION 10 APPLY TO WATER USERS?
In the realm of an irrigation diversion, the HCP process can be used by an

individual irrigator or an irrigation district to make sure their continued actions will only
incidentally ‘take’ fish. The best way to get water in-stream for fish without buying out
irrigators would be a reduction of water used to irrigate crops by encouraging more
efficient irrigation or enforcing against wasteful practices. As waste is a term that
typically compares other similar irrigation practices to the one in question, unless all
adjacent irrigators are already efficient, it is highly unlikely to call that use a ‘waste’ of
water.105 Also, it may not be possible to get irrigators to comply because a state system
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Id. at 4-3. If the HCP does not include other species that may eventually be listed, the permittee will be liable if a ‘take’ occurs
even though protections for that first species, such as an improved fish screen will benefit the ‘eventually’ listed fish.
Id. at 3-14.
104
Id. at 3-21.
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Neuman, Janet C., Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use. 28 ENVTL. L.
919, 975-976 (1998). Professor Neuman’s analysis of beneficial use tied to waste sheds light on the fact states do not enforce prior
appropriation and beneficial use does not promote conservation. “…because the concept of waste is so generous and poorly defined,
and because forfeiture is not aggressively enforced, the doctrine [beneficial use] does not even begin to maximize the number of users
who could be supported by a given amount of water.” Also, “the beneficial use doctrine encourages maximum consumptive use of
water by any given water user, but does not necessarily maximize the number of water users.” And finally, “Reliance on a legal
standard that endorses custom will not encourage the desired conservation behavior. Custom does not evolve fast enough to cope with
103
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that encourages conservation and efficiency might not be in place. The state may have to
step in, or be forced to step in if irrigators do not pursue a HCP.
Because water rights are given out and administered by a state agency, it has been
suggested that the state can be held liable since the permit effectively promotes habitat
modification by the use of water.106 A few federal court cases have dealt with this issue
and have consistently found that the state or local agency should consider the ESA when
issuing permits to a third party because actions authorized by the state may ‘take’ a listed
species.107 In New Mexico, this would only apply when a water right is changed or
transferred because all surface water has been appropriated. If the water right change may
impact a listed species, and the issuing agency believes its approval may make it the
target of an ESA lawsuit, the agency may be able to hold up that change until the
permittee completes a HCP.108 This is an example of what is termed ‘vicarious’ liability.
If future cases hold states liable under the ESA due to permitting decisions that result in a
taking, then the states will have to revamp their water codes to ensure that listed fish are
not brought to extinction via the prior appropriation system. Irrigators and even state
government would prefer the federal government not get involved in what they deem a
state matter in the issuance of water right permits. Unless states provide incentives for
irrigators to conserve, this issue will continue to play out in the courts with the potential
for states losing some of their discretionary power over water rights administration.

severe overappropriation, critical instream demands, increasing competition among diverse demands, and population growth across
the West.”
106
See RUHL, supra note 94 at 373-375.
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Id. The author refers to Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1996), United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81
(D. Mass. 1998), Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County (Loggerhead I), 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995), and
Loggerhead II, 148 F. 3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998). These cases all discuss the discretionary role that state and local agencies hold when
issuing permits for activities that can ‘take’ a listed species. It is interesting to note that although these cases are relatively few in
number, “no court has rejected the principle that state and local governments can be held accountable for issuing discretionary
approvals under state and local law if such approvals enable third parties to engage in activities that cause take.” Id. at 374.
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Some states have stepped up with programs that try to get water in-stream by
offering incentives to conserve. States have also created water banks and lease programs
that are used for in-stream flows. These programs were not just initiated with an eye for
ESA compliance but rather reflect the views held by citizens to keep riverine habitats as
functioning ecosystems rather than conduits that only deliver water to irrigators.
1.
a)

Oregon
Conserved Water Program
In 1987, the state of Oregon initiated the Conserved Water Program (CWP) that

provides an incentive for irrigators to conserve water. Essentially, if an irrigator decides
to become more efficient, they are able to keep 75% of the conserved water with the
remaining 25% going to the state in a water bank that leaves the water in-stream.109 The
irrigator then has the option to leave more than 25% in-stream. Currently, the state has
recognized the CWP is underutilized,110 and in 2002, only 0.6 cfs (cubic feet per second)
was realized under the CWP.111 Leases and transfers of water in-stream amounted to just
over 360 cfs in the same year.112 The Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD)
recently conducted a survey to identify water right holders eligible to participate in the
program but did not explain why the participation rate was so low as compared to the
amount of water left in-stream for leasing. Since the program started in 1987, the water
resources department has only received 36 applications with all of them between 1995
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ORS § 690-018-0012.
Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (2003) 2001-2003 Oregon Plan Biennial Report 38. Salem, Oregon. Available at:
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and 2004.113 The State of Oregon has access to grant funding through the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board and this money can be used to assist irrigators
participating in the CWP.114
There may be many reasons for lack of participation, and it has been suggested
that “unless the potential value of the saved water to the user (either for use or sale) is
significant, there really is not much incentive for water users to pursue conservation
measures.”115 And also, the program is voluntary, and Oregon does not actively enforce
against waste. If the incentive is not backed up with a good regulatory ‘stick,’ irrigators
will just continue with their customary irrigation practices.116 However, if these irrigators
are in areas with endangered fish, just the threat of their diversion is enough to show their
actions can cause future ‘harm’ that could amount to a ‘take.’ By using this program,
irrigators could be essentially self-permitting by conducting an action that may prevent
the ‘take’ of fish or even enhance habitat.117 But to be in full compliance, a Section 10
HCP is necessary.
In addition, by offering this program, the state may in fact deflect the notion of
‘vicarious’ liability. If the state’s issuance of a water right was in fact challenged, a court
may find that existence of this program is enough to show the state is attempting to
comply with the ESA by offering incentives and acting in a collaborative manner.
However, as is the case in Oregon, not enforcing against waste may be something the
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According to Bob Rice of the Oregon Water Resources Department, “Since the program's inception in 1987, the [Oregon Water
Resources Department] has received 36 applications for allocations of [Conserved Water], with all of these occurring in the past 9
years.” E-mail correspondence received on 26 August 2004.
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water.” E-mail correspondence received on 12 December 2004.
115
See NEUMAN, supra note 105 at 286. Referring to Oregon’s Conserved Water Program (CWP).
116
Id. It is also suggested that because water use patterns are not well known, it would be difficult for the state to determine how much
water savings would result.
117
See RUHL supra, note 94 at 363. This action may give an irrigator peace of mind, but it doesn’t give them the necessary Section 10
HCP immunity for an incidental take.

46

court would find inexcusable and insist that the state uphold its own laws or be
potentially liable under the ESA. In any case, the program is still emerging and could be
an example for other states to use, including New Mexico. It gets water in-stream for fish,
it gives irrigators more water when they conserve, and it potentially deflects ESA liability
since both the state and irrigators are acting to get more water in-stream.
b) Water Leasing and Banking
Oregon created the Deschutes Water Exchange Annual Water Leasing Program in
2001 to augment river flows in the upper Deschutes Basin.118 It allows water users to
lease water to be placed in-stream.119 The program is only three years old but initial
results are promising. In 2003, 3,400 of 160,000 acres (2%) in the upper Deschutes Basin
were leased for in-stream flows.120
The Walla Walla Lease Bank was created for the Walla Walla Basin to ensure
flows are high enough to protect endangered fish. The OWRD administers this program
with Oregon Water Trust, a private organization that helps facilitate transfers of water instream.121 This is similar to the Deschutes program and only places water in-stream on a
temporary basis.122 What prompted this program was a Section 9 ‘take’ of bull trout in
the Walla Walla River during the 1998 and 1999 irrigation seasons. USFWS threatened
to assess civil penalties of up to $25,000 per fish unless the irrigation district changed
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Washington State Department of Ecology and WestWater Research, 2004. Analysis of Water Banks in the Western States, Pub. No.
04-11-011 at 100. 156p. Available at: http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/wtrbank.html [Accessed 23 May 2005].
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their irrigation management practices.123 What is more interesting is that senior water
right holders were targeted, which is contrary to what Bricker and Filippi (2000) argue as
the listing agencies preferred policy of proportionate reductions.124 The irrigation district
came up with an interim agreement to get water in-stream and was able to gain consensus
with the local tribes and environmental groups.125 This agreement was successful at
restoring flows in the Walla Walla basin and early estimates suggested that fish
populations were stable and improving.126 However, a Section 10 HCP needs to be
completed to allow for an incidental take in order to reduce the irrigator’s Section 9
liability.127 This process was done collaboratively and without the use of lawsuits,
showing that results can be achieved when groups with different interests work together.
2.

Washington Water Acquisition Program
The State of Washington has a trust water rights program that is set up to enhance

and restore flows in critical portions of streams and rivers where salmon migrate and
spawn.128 Water can be sold to the state to be held in-stream, leased to the state on a splitseason or dry-year basis, or donated to the state.129 As of December 2003, the state has
recorded over 80 transactions with most occurring in 2003. It is important to note that all
but nine transactions were leases.130 In 2004, the state had 5.5 million dollars to fund this
program.131
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Washington has also created an Irrigation Efficiencies Grants Program (IEGP)
that works with conservation/irrigation districts to help with on-farm efficiencies and
conveyance systems.132 The ultimate goal is to give money and technical assistance to
farmers to help aid in irrigation efficiency. The conserved water is then placed in-stream
through the Water Acquisition Program. It is not clear if the conserved water goes instream through a lease or a purchase. Four projects were finished in 2003 in targeted
areas saving 4.1 cfs and 979.7 acre-feet per year. So far, the program has received 7.8
million dollars in appropriations.133 This system is similar to the Oregon plan in that it
tries to promote efficient use of water through incentives and gets water in-stream. It has
only been in place since 2001 and it remains to be seen if the program will be effective.
Preliminary reviews suggest that Washington irrigators prefer the Irrigation Efficiencies
Program to the Water Acquisition Program because it offers more certainty in their use of
the water right and may increase their land value.134 One question that remains for the
long-term is whether the in-stream right would be owned by the irrigator and just leased
to the state, or would the state attempt to purchase some of that conserved water to
remain in-stream.
These state-based incentives have the potential to get water in-stream and allow
continued irrigation. The IEGP appears more flexible than the Oregon CWP due to the
lease options and the possibility more grant money is available as an incentive to
irrigators. As most applicants have chosen to lease their water, the gains to endangered
fish may only be temporary if the land eventually returns to irrigation. If the state were to
132
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purchase water, more could be left in-stream permanently. Nonetheless, irrigators that use
these options (especially those in Oregon that are under the CWP) should also
incorporate a HCP that would give them even more assurance that their actions will only
amount to an incidental take and also have the effect of increasing available in-stream
habitat. Again, the presence of a state-based program may deflect ‘vicarious’ liability
lawsuits over whether the state permitting process violates the ESA, however it means
that the irrigator would be the focus of any potential citizen suit if not protected under a
Section 10 HCP.
3.

Idaho’s ‘Rental Pools’ for Endangered Fish
In Idaho, water banks are called ‘rental pools.’ The Lemhi River Rental Pool

created in 2001 has a specific purpose of getting water in-stream for salmon.135 The bank
is set up by the state to allow the US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) to lease water from
irrigators when flows are low. If flows dip below the critical flow level set by NOAA
Fisheries, then it triggers federal regulatory action. This rental pool is meant to keep
flows above a critical flow level.136 Because Idaho created the legal mechanism to allow
water leasing for in-stream purposes, this should help circumvent any ESA action that
NOAA Fisheries would take because the program will keep flows above a critical level.
Even though this was completed via a Section 7 consultation due to federal involvement
by the USBR, it provides an example of federal and state cooperation to help irrigators.
In this case, irrigation efficiency was addressed and it was NOAA Fisheries opinion that
part of the mitigation for fish would actually increase conveyance and irrigation
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efficiencies. However, there is no mention that this water could be left in-stream and
there is concern that irrigators would use the conserved water and increase depletions,
thereby decreasing in-stream flows.137 This is obviously something the USBR and NOAA
Fisheries want to avoid because if irrigators used more water it would defeat the purpose
of the leasing program.
This is another example of a state working with irrigators to ensure survival of
endangered fish. Action by the state provides an incentive for irrigators to leave water instream through a short-term lease and ensures there is no Section 9 ‘take.’ This helps
reduce liability for the irrigators and the state.

VI.

Section 10 and Efficient Irrigation in New Mexico
How can the examples shown above be applied to water users in New Mexico?

As it appears in Idaho, Oregon and Washington, leasing is a short-term option very
popular with irrigators as there are only a few examples of irrigators selling or giving a
portion of their conserved water to the state. However, because leasing is short-term, it
does not provide a constant water source that endangered fish need for recovery. Leasing
will eventually be more expensive than buying the water right since some yearly lease
programs will end up leasing the same water more than once. Also, the increased demand
for water by cities will give the states competition when looking to leave water in-stream.
If a municipality offers more for the water be it a lease or purchase, the water may go to
that municipality rather than in-stream.
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It appears that leasing programs are the first step in developing relationships with
irrigators. As irrigators lease water for a period, they may decide to eventually sell their
water right. The leasing process also builds trust with the state. If irrigators see that the
state wants to be flexible and not just condemn or relinquish their water right, they may
be more inclined to work with state irrigation efficiency programs, especially if money is
available. The few state-based programs that attempt to get irrigators to conserve and
leave some water in-stream are not as popular for reasons such as fear that property
values will decline if there is less water available, and concern that scrutiny of their water
right will lead to partial relinquishment.138

A.

WATER LEASING AND BANKING
New Mexico has started using a state water bank program to meet compact

deliveries to Texas via the Pecos River. Initially, the Interstate Stream Commission (ISC)
leased water from irrigators to meet compact requirements. The program then progressed
into a water bank where the state purchases water rights to leave them in-stream.139 This
program is relatively new and secondary benefits to fish populations remain to be seen.
There is a proposal to try and lease water in-stream for the threatened Pecos bluntnose
shiner, and the State Engineer authorized an emergency water transfer in-stream during
2003.140 The proposal involves the USBR since they are in charge of irrigation delivery.
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New Mexico also allows water leasing between ‘individuals.’ The statute was
created to allow irrigators in the Elephant Butte irrigation district the opportunity to lease
water to the city of Las Cruces for a period of 40 years.141
The main problem facing New Mexico with respect to endangered fish is the
absence of statutory provisions allowing for in-stream flows. Statutes could be amended,
but many attempts have failed. Listed fish on rivers under compact administration may
benefit from state efforts to get water in-stream, however it is unknown if the state will
go further and establish explicit in-stream flow laws. Absent any state action, there are
two New Mexico attorney general opinions that say it is possible for the state to change
an existing water right to an in-stream right with conditions.142 There are no specific laws
or constitutional provisions that disallow it, however this has not been tried on a
noticeable scale and a future court case may answer the question once and for all if New
Mexico can legally administer in-stream water rights.

B.

IN-STREAM FLOWS IN NEW MEXICO?
Even if irrigators decide to leave water in-stream for fish, there is no mechanism

to ensure that water would be left in-stream. That water would likely be used by a junior
appropriator. New Mexico is one of the last states in the West that does not give statutory
recognition to in-stream flows,143 and is still stuck on the idea that a man-made diversion
is required to establish a water right.144 Plus, beneficial use is not narrowly defined in
statute as it is in many other western states, leaving the courts to interpret what
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constitutes a beneficial use.145 Despite repeated attempts to set in-stream flow legislation,
no laws have passed, however there have been a few water right transfers that changed
‘use’ to in-stream flow.146
If an irrigator were to enter into a HCP on a river absent a state system for
recognizing in-stream flows, it may still have enough benefit for USFWS approval. For
example, if an irrigator conserved water due to greater efficiency and applied for a HCP
that recognized his water savings, the water not used might go downstream to satisfy
another junior user. USFWS should recognize that individual’s contribution instead of
denying them a HCP just because the downstream junior irrigator may end up dewatering
the stream through their diversion.
The junior irrigator may see this action by the upstream irrigator as increasing the
junior’s liability since the upstream irrigator is now shielded from a Section 9 ‘take.’ This
may then force them to become more efficient and leave water in-stream. The more
irrigators who follow suit, the greater the liability may be for those who choose not to act.
In any case, the threat of Section 9 action against an irrigator will likely increase if more
species become listed. If the Office of the State Engineer decides to help out, the State
Engineer will have to come up with a plan that will assist irrigators and at the same time
recognize the values of water left in-stream for ecological purposes, not just compact
deliveries.
The irrigator attached to the HCP may have a transferable water right in the
conserved water. Since the State Engineer has allowed a few transfers of water from
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existing uses to in-stream ‘use,’147 there may be value for that conserved water if it is left
in-stream and there is a willing buyer. Environmental groups may take advantage of this
and find landowners willing to conserve and leave some water in-stream. This idea has
merit if similar lawsuits like IWP v. Jones are won on behalf of fish, and the State
Engineer decides not to explicitly amend the water code to allow for in-stream flow for
fish and wildlife purposes.

C.

IRRIGATION EFFICIENCY
There are many directives within the New Mexico water code that speak to

‘efficient use,’ ‘conservation of water,’ and ‘good agricultural practices.’ The State
Engineer even went so far to heavily regulate waste by ground water users in artesian
basins due to flooding problems and to keep artesian pressure high enough so irrigators
would not have to pump.148
1.

Water Project Finance Act
An important statute that attempts to promote voluntary conservation through

incentives is the Water Project Finance Act, Article 4A. It was created in 2001 and
recently amended in 2003. The Act recognizes the scarcity of water in New Mexico and
the need for efficient use and conservation so that all can benefit from its use.149 Wording
147
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such as “the public welfare depends on efficient use and conservation of water…,” shows
the importance of recognizing the public nature of water and implies the public is better
off when water is conserved and used efficiently. The public welfare may eventually be
interpreted to where some water should be left in-stream for fish and wildlife purposes.
The political subdivisions that this Act speaks to include municipalities, counties,
irrigation districts, conservancy districts, and acequias to name just a few.150 Priority for
projects comes from the 2003 State Water Plan.151
2.

New Mexico State Water Plan
One of the common priorities, goals and objectives of the recent 2003 State Water

Plan is “promoting conservation and the efficient use of water.”152 The Plan recognizes
future population growth in New Mexico is inevitable and that “…conservation and
efficient use of water will be increasingly necessary to meet the State’s present and future
needs for water.”153 Water markets are identified as a way to temporarily or permanently
transfer water to other uses. If an irrigator uses water in a more efficient manner, the
water market can act as a “temporary fallowing agreement(s) for conservation or
efficiency purposes.”154 To make the transfer process more attractive to irrigators, the
Plan emphasizes voluntary conservation and financial incentives, supposedly relaxing
forfeiture and abandonment to allow farmers the option to sell or lease the conserved
water. Nowhere does it mention use of strict statutory mandates to force conservation and
irrigation efficiency. A telling statement in the water plan mentions, “water saved through
efficiency, resource conservation and protection and fair distribution and allocation of New Mexico’s scarce water resources for
beneficial purposes of use within the state.
150
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151
N.M. STAT.ANN § 72-4A-5.1.
152
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efficient use, conservation, and reuse may be the only practical new source of water” due
to the limited water supply in the State.155
If the reality is that conservation of existing uses provides the only new source of
water, voluntary measures are not going to necessarily result in water for growing
municipalities. Unless the State Water Plan eventually leads to new policy or laws that
can proactively address increased irrigation efficiency, supply might not keep up with
demand. This will pit growing municipalities and advocates for protecting endangered
species against each other with the municipalities winning because they may be willing to
pay more money for water. Also, the fact the statutes are silent on in-stream flows does
not help.
3.
a)

New Mexico Statutes
Existing Statutes
New Mexico legislators amended a law during the 2003 legislative session that

may make it easier for irrigators to conserve water:
In the issuance of permits to appropriate water for irrigation or in the adjudication
of the rights to the use of water for that purpose, the amount allowed shall be
based upon beneficial use and in accordance with good agricultural practices and
the amount allowed shall not exceed such amount. The state engineer shall permit
the amount allowed to be diverted at a rate consistent with good agricultural
practices and that will result in the most effective use of available water in order
to prevent waste. Improved irrigation methods resulting in the conservation of
water shall not affect an owner’s water rights.156 (Emphasis added).
This statute applies to New Mexico irrigators saying that if they apply for a new water
right or change in water right, it will be scrutinized to ensure the use does not amount to
waste. The most important part is the last sentence, implying that if an irrigator does
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conserve water through more efficient irrigation, the state cannot take the right through
forfeiture. This wording was added in 2003 and looking at the Fiscal Impact Report for
House Bill 977, the State Engineer did not have a policy to forfeit conserved water and
wanted wording to ‘codify this practice.’157 The significant issues are as follows:
OSE has not exercised the forfeiture clause on any reduced water use resulting
from conservation efforts. This bill would codify this practice. While the State
Engineer supports conservation efforts, the agency is concerned (sic) taking any
water being saved due to improvements in irrigation, and then put to additional
beneficial use, will increase depletions of water in the system. The goal needs to
be to keep the system in balance by increasing return flows to the river and not
developing new uses.158
The justification for this law is somewhat confusing since the purpose is to allow
conservation, yet it implies that the water user must transfer the water, or just not use it
once it is conserved. The State Engineer is either concerned that applying new conserved
water to other fields may change the timing of return flows to the river, or is concerned
that transferring water out of the stream system once conserved will result in lower return
flows since less water is being applied. These are valid concerns, yet it is no different
than what the state must do when reviewing a change in place or purpose of use. Oregon
allows this ‘spreading’ to occur when water is conserved, but only after a comprehensive
review to ensure that there is no harm to other water users. The amount of water left instream may offset the return flow issue. If the State Engineer is that concerned about
return flows to the river due to water conservation but will not pass in-stream flow
legislation, the conserved water should then be purchased and left in-stream for compact
deliveries. This may have the desired effect of intermittently creating in-stream flows for
fish while satisfying compact obligations. However, it does not answer the question of
157
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how this will help individual irrigators reduce their ESA liability. The water code must be
developed further to come up with a successful program that will encourage irrigators to
leave water in-stream.
If and when an irrigator does apply for a HCP, it is not known if USFWS will
accept the state program to leave water in-stream for compact deliveries as providing
secondary, albeit necessary benefits to listed fish. A better program would actually allow
for in-stream flows. It is unknown if the few water right changes to allow in-stream flow
will continue and if they will even be held as valid if challenged.
b) New Administrative Laws
A few promising statements regarding administration of surface waters were
introduced and passed as rules in 2005. First, beneficial use is expanded to include fish
and wildlife purposes.159 Also, irrigation efficiency is defined as “The portion of the duty
of water, expressed as a percentage, consumed to meet the crop irrigation
requirement.”160 It is clear that the state is making efforts to recognize the value of water
that is used by fish and wildlife, and that efficient irrigation is important enough to be
defined so future laws and rules refer to a specific definition, not many definitions.
Despite the uncertainties over the status of in-stream flows, New Mexico is at
least moving in the right direction by encouraging conservation and providing irrigators
the funds to become more efficient. Hopefully these efforts will be combined with instream flows to give New Mexico irrigators the incentive to become more efficient and
leave some of their conserved water in-stream. As examples from other states have
December 2004].
158
Id.
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59

shown, just having the system in place does not mean irrigators will line up and
voluntarily leave water in-stream. The irrigators must be able to trust the State Engineer
and in turn, there must be a combination of financial incentives and statutory changes,
such as certainty the State Engineer will not relinquish their water right when it is
reviewed.

D.

SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENTS
A recent review of HCPs in the southwestern region administered by the USFWS

shows that no HCPs have been issued in New Mexico.161 It did show however that the
Pueblo of Santa Ana has entered into a safe harbor agreement with the USFWS for the
Rio Grande silvery minnow and the Southwestern willow flycatcher. This agreement was
completed in July 2004 for a period of 25 years. These types of agreements allow a
landowner to participate in restoration activities on their own land in exchange for an
‘enhancement of survival’ permit that allows some incidental take.162 Safe harbor
provides benefits for habitat enhancement whereas a Section 10 HCP attempts to mitigate
habitat destruction. The condition for safe harbor is that the listed species does not
currently reside on that property, but if they do take refuge as a result of habitat
enhancement, the landowner is covered under an ITS. However, “Safe harbor agreements
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do not affect any preexisting restrictions that may apply to a property as a result of
endangered species already living there.”163
This agreement may help irrigators, just as it is helping the Pueblo of Santa Ana.
As the Pueblo works to restore riparian habitat, the endangered silvery minnow may take
refuge in their 6-mile reach of river (if it has not already). This agreement will offer them
some protection against ‘take’ especially if the existing coverage under the current
Section 7 ITS for the middle Rio Grande is withdrawn. Leaving more water in the river
may not be enough for an irrigator to qualify for a safe harbor agreement because suitable
habitat is also necessary for that fish species to survive. Those irrigators who may have
that option can benefit substantially by entering into this agreement. Safe Harbor
Agreements may be a better option for some irrigators than a Section 10 HCP due to the
specific nature of their action and the regulatory hurdles one must face when completing
a Section 10 HCP.
Deciding which works better for an irrigator may be complicated and could come
down to whether the diversion was either pre-existing, new and whether riparian habitat
exists on the irrigator’s lands. The use of a water right can be looked at as a flux between
habitat destruction and habitat enhancement; when the water is being diverted,
destruction might occur. When water is not being diverted, the habitat can return to its
natural state. This could complicate matters for an irrigator trying to determine if
applying for a safe harbor agreement or a HCP. USFWS should be able to direct the
applicant towards the right project depending on the circumstances.
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New Mexico is attempting to change the statutes and administrative code to allow
for water conservation and more efficient irrigation. The main problem is the fact that instream flows are not recognized in the statutes. Adding to that problem is the question of
how the State Engineer will treat conserved waters. The existing statutory option is to
transfer it to another user, which would likely be a growing municipality. As transferring
water in-stream is relatively new and not tested, this option may or may not work.
Because of this, it may make it more difficult for USFWS to sign off on an HCP or Safe
Harbor Agreement that includes leaving more water in-stream. However, the Santa Ana
agreement is a good sign that the USFWS may support these types of agreements in the
future.

VII. Conclusions
There is no doubt that irrigators in New Mexico will face increasing pressures
from those who want their water, whether it is thirsty municipalities, the ISC needing to
meet compact deliveries, or the federal government looking to increase in-stream flows
for endangered fish. This pressure is a result of irrigators using a majority of the New
Mexico’s water. In other western states, there are innovative lease and purchase options
that let farmers continue to irrigate and apportion some of that water for fish. The State
Engineer should look at adopting some of these ideas to help New Mexico irrigators that
face Section 9 ESA liability. As these programs develop, New Mexico irrigators will
have to choose between complying with the ESA in order to continue irrigating, or
selling their water right to municipalities.
Currently, New Mexico law is set up to allow for this to happen; irrigators can
either sell their water right to a municipality, or lease it long-term. They might be able to
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transfer a water right to an in-stream use as a few already have; however the statutes do
not yet recognize it making it a high risk. If irrigators transfer some, but not all of that
water to municipalities, they are still potentially liable for a ‘take’ under the ESA. It
would be an easy way out to sell the water right and reduce their liability altogether,
placing the Section 9 burden on additional appropriators on the stream or the
municipality that purchased the water right.
Because of the Federal Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, water needs for
endangered species can trump Federal compact obligations to a downstream state, and
state issued water rights.164 The federal government would rather cooperate with
irrigators than take their water away through regulation or condemnation. The ESA
specifically mandates cooperation when water resources are at stake because states have
been traditionally left on their own to apportion water. Most states are not comfortable
with this federal involvement that has and will continue to erode their administration of
water rights. However, protecting species from the brink of extinction is a nationwide
effort that Congress gave the highest priority; those who have modified habitat and
continue to do so today must make sacrifices.
ESA based programs for private irrigators are voluntary and can be combined
with a combination of state laws to enhance the project. The more flexible the state law,
the better chance irrigators will want to participate. Also important are incentive
programs that can help irrigators become more efficient. Some western states such as
Oregon and Washington have these programs in place and are slowly getting irrigators to
respond. Case law regarding ESA liability and private irrigators is just beginning to
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develop and as it does, more irrigators will see the need to reduce their liability by
leaving more water in-stream. The Section 10 Habitat Conservation Plan and Safe Harbor
Agreement are the main federal options available to irrigators that allow them to continue
their irrigation practices and not be held liable if a few endangered fish die as a result.
Existing diversions that dewater a river may already contribute to the death of a large
number of fish, and leaving water in-stream by improving irrigation efficiency can show
the USFWS that effort is being made on their part to mitigate the negative effects to fish.
This way, irrigators get to divert and reduce their liability for a Section 9 ‘take,’ and more
water is left in-stream for fish. All that remains is for the State Engineer or the State
Legislature to step up and create incentive programs for private irrigators. If not, there
will be continued legal uncertainty over the dewatering of streams and rivers. This will
eventually lead to more protracted legal battles such as the one over the Rio Grande
silvery minnow and may eventually result in government mandated in-stream flows that
will force irrigators to reduce their water diversions. Since irrigation is important in New
Mexico, both culturally and economically, it is important that a system be designed to
satisfy the needs for endangered fish and water for irrigators.
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Doremus, Holly, Water, population growth, and endangered species in the West. 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 401 (2001). The author
states that just because states enter into an interstate compact, they can not ignore the ESA.
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Glossary of Terms
Acequia – The name given to a traditional community irrigation ditch in New Mexico.
An acequia is a political subdivision recognized by the State of New Mexico and has
specific statutory directives that recognize its unique status within the State.
Adjudication – In this paper, a court process where all irrigators on a stream are enjoined
in a lawsuit that it meant to determine the extent and validity of a water right in its
relationship between the state water resource authority and between other irrigators.
Appellant – The party that is appealing a decision by a lower court for review by a
higher court.
Appellee – The party that is opposing the appeal by the Appellant for review by a higher
court.
Beneficial Use – A term used in Western water law to emphasize that the use of water
must be ‘beneficial’ or it is considered waste. Each state defines or does not define what
constitutes a beneficial use. Some of these uses include irrigation, domestic use,
municipal use, industrial use and in-stream flows. In New Mexico, beneficial use is
statutorily defined as ‘the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water.’
Administrative rules give specific definitions for beneficial use.
Causation – A legal term referring to the cause of an action. The degree of the
relationship between the cause of action and its outcome or effect is often termed
‘proximate cause.’
Defendant – The party that is brought to court by another party for resolution of a
dispute. See Plaintiff.
Endangered Species Act – An act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1973 to provide
protection for species under the threat of extinction.
Environmental Assessment – A preliminary study, typically a checklist, that determines
whether further action is necessary to study the impacts of a proposed federal project on
the environment. If more study is warranted, then an environmental impact statement is
completed.
Environmental Impact Statement – An in-depth report that studies the impacts of the
proposed federal project on the environment and potential mitigation measures to reduce
its impact. This study also addresses the feasibility of alternatives to the proposed action
as well as no action.
Habitat Conservation Plan – An option available to private parties under section 10 of
the Endangered Species Act that allows for mitigation of habitat modifying activities that
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have the potential to ‘take’ members of a species. This plan, once approved by either the
US Fish and Wildlife Service or NOAA Fisheries, gives the applicant immunity from a
‘take’ lawsuit as long as the activity does not take more than what is allowed under the
Incidental Take Statement.
Incidental Take Statement – An option under Section 7 and Section 10 of the
Endangered Species Act that allows the applicant the ability to ‘incidentally’ take a
certain amount of species that would occur as the result of an otherwise lawful activity.
Injunction – A court order issued to temporarily or permanently stop an action at the
bequest of an appealing party. In some cases, if the action is mitigated, the injunction is
lifted. In this paper, injunctions are used to stop an imminent action that will violate
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act. Injunctions for ESA cases are not ‘equitable’
because Congress puts greater weight on species protection.
In-stream Flow – This term refers to water that remains in a stream. In this paper, a
water right may be associated with an in-stream flow where the water is not used in the
traditional sense of the word, but left in-stream for the benefit of riparian habitat or
aquatic species.
Interstate Stream Commission – The Interstate Stream Commission is a state agency
that works with the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer on water resource issues.
Its primary directive is to ensure that New Mexico meets its compact requirements for
interstate streams that are subject to sharing agreements between New Mexico and other
downstream states. The Commission also works to ensure that upstream states deliver
water as outlined in interstate sharing agreements.
New Mexico Office of the State Engineer – The state agency that manages the
appropriation and management of both surface and ground water in New Mexico.
NOAA Fisheries – A United States Federal agency housed under the US Commerce
Department that is tasked with management of fisheries within the offshore territorial
waters of the United States. This agency has jurisdiction over fish that spend part of their
life cycle in the ocean and then spawn in United States streams. NOAA Fisheries is the
primary agency for enforcement of the Endangered Species Act for ocean species. This
agency was formally known as the National Marine Fisheries Service, or NMFS.
Plaintiff – The party that typically initiates a courtroom hearing over a dispute with
another party. See defendant.
Prior Appropriation – The system by which water is appropriated in most western
states. This term means ‘first in time, first in right,’ where the first appropriator of stream
water or ground water is senior and the subsequent appropriation is junior. In times of
shortage, the senior appropriator is fully satisfied before water is allowed to be used by
the junior appropriator.
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Pueblo – The name given to native peoples in New Mexico that have traditionally
occupied the same lands before European settlement. These lands are different than
‘reservation’ lands, as reservations imply land reserved by the government for a specific
group of native peoples that were moved from their ancestral lands. Water rights held by
pueblos are recognized as ‘prior and paramount’ to any right held by subsequent Spanish
and northern European settlers.
Real Property – A term for property that includes both land and buildings. Real property
can not be taken by government unless compensation is made to the owner.
Safe Harbor Agreement – A federal program aimed at those who want to improve
habitat and receive a permit for incidental take if a threatened or endangered species takes
up residence in the newly improved habitat.
Tort – A name for common law derived from court decisions.
US Bureau of Reclamation – A United States Federal agency housed within the US
Department of the Interior. This agency is charged with building dams to create
reservoirs and generate hydropower in selected states throughout the western United
States. The water stored behind the dams is either owned by Reclamation and leased to
irrigators, or owned by the irrigators and stored for eventual delivery. Reclamation can
also store water for environmental purposes or recreation.
US Fish and Wildlife Service – A United States Federal agency housed within the US
Department of the Interior. It is charged with enforcement of federal laws that deal with
fish and wildlife that reside within the United States or ones that are migratory and just
pass through. This agency is the primary agency for enforcement of the Endangered
Species Act for fish and wildlife within the terrestrial United States.
US Forest Service – A United States Federal agency housed within the US Department
of Agriculture. This agency is charged with management of the National Forests.
Vicarious Liability – This term means holding a third party responsible for an action that
it did not directly commit.
Waste – A term in western water law that describes uses that are not ‘beneficial.’ Waste
can also be defined in term of irrigation efficiency when comparing similar irrigation
methods in the same region.
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Appendix I: Abbreviations and Acronyms
BN – Burlington Northern
CWP – Conserved Water Program
CFS – Cubic feet per second
EA – Environmental Assessment
EIS – Environmental Impact Statement
ESA – Endangered Species Act
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency
HCP – Habitat Conservation Plan
ISC – Interstate Stream Commission
IEGP – Irrigation Efficiencies Grants Program
IWP – Idaho Watersheds Project
ITS – Incidental Take Statement
NOAA – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NWF – National Wildlife Federation
USBR – US Bureau of Reclamation
USFWS – US Fish and Wildlife Service
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